Lewis & Clark Law School

Lewis & Clark Law School Digital Commons
Faculty Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2011

Why Aboriginal Title is a Fee Simple Absolute
Michael Blumm
Lewis & Clark Law School, blumm@lclark.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawcommons.lclark.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the
Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Blumm, Michael, "Why Aboriginal Title is a Fee Simple Absolute" (2011). Faculty Articles. 38.
https://lawcommons.lclark.edu/faculty_articles/38

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Lewis & Clark Law School
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Lewis &
Clark Law School Digital Commons. For more information, please contact sarahjohnson@lclark.edu.

Do Not Delete

2/14/2012 1:14 PM

WHY ABORIGINAL TITLE IS A FEE SIMPLE ABSOLUTE
by
Michael C. Blumm∗
The Supreme Court’s 1823 decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh is a
foundation case in both Indian Law and American Property Law. But
the case is one of the most misunderstood decisions in Anglo-American
law. Often cited for the propositions of the plenary power of the U.S.
Congress over Indian tribes and of the uncompensated takings of Indiantitle lands, the Marshall Court decision actually is better interpreted to
recognize that Indian tribes had fee simple absolute to their ancestral
lands. This Article explains why the “discovery doctrine” should have
been interpreted to be a fee simple absolute subject to the federal
government’s right of preemption. Had the doctrine laid down by
Johnson been properly interpreted, its national and international effects
today would have been much less pernicious.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Johnson v. M’Intosh, a case that introduces many law students to
1
property law, has been badly misunderstood. The decision of Chief
Justice John Marshall brought the discovery doctrine to American law
2
and applied it for the first time to a case and controversy. According to
Marshall, discovery required the creation of a new property law concept
3
which became known as “aboriginal” or “occupancy” title. Thus,
discovery left the Native American tribes with a land title that protected
their possession but drastically limited their ability to convey their
4
property to others, a sui generis concept previously unknown in AngloAmerican law. The unusual nature of native title allowed jurists in the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries to both question whether natives

1
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Johnson is the first case in
several popular Property casebooks, including JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 3
(7th ed. 2010); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW:
OWNERSHIP, USE, AND CONSERVATION 9 (2006); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW:
RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 4 (4th ed. 2006). Johnson is the second case in ALFRED
BROPHY ET AL., INTEGRATING SPACES: PROPERTY LAW AND RACE 16 (2011) and the third
case in JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 28 (2009). Two other popular casebooks, JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 63 (8th ed. 2002) and THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH,
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 110 (2007), feature Johnson prominently in
introductory chapters.
2
The discovery doctrine arguably originated with the Crusades and the legal
thinking accompanying that effort to extend Papal authority to the Holy Land during
the eleventh through the thirteenth centuries, which produced Christian “natural
law” philosophy. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 15 (1990). Later, in 1436, the Pope granted
Portugal exclusive authority to colonize Africa and in 1493 gave Spain authority to
colonize native populations in the vicinity of Columbus’ discoveries in the Western
Hemisphere. See Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title,
Tribal Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources
Policy in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 719 (2004). In 1537, under the influence
of Spanish theologian and jurist Francisco de Victoria, Pope Paul III proclaimed that
native peoples discovered by Christians “are by no means to be deprived of their
liberty or the possession of their property.” Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32
MINN. L. REV. 28, 45 (1947). Felix Cohen attributed to Victoria the international law
notions of equality between natives and whites, federal sovereignty over native affairs,
and government protection of natives. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 1.02[1], at 13–14 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005). This was the body of
international law that Chief Justice Marshall drew upon in applying the doctrine of
discovery for the first time in U.S. caselaw. See Blumm, supra, at 719–26.
3
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574, 585, 587, 591–92 (repeated references to
“occupancy” title).
4
By restricting the tribes’ ability to convey their property to the federal
government, the Johnson decision created a monopsony—a market where there is
only one buyer. See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the
Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1105 & n.167 (2000).
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5

could protect their lands from trespass and to deny natives just
6
compensation from government seizures.
The latter results were inconsistent with the principles laid down by
the Marshall Court in a series of cases, of which the Johnson decision was
7
only the centerpiece. From the 1810 decision of Fletcher v. Peck, through
8
the 1835 decision of Mitchel v. United States, the Marshall Court produced
9
five decisions that Americanized the law of discovery. The discovery
doctrine laid down by the Marshall Court 1) gave discoverers an exclusive
right to purchase Indian lands; 2) simultaneously imposed a partial
restraint on alienation of native lands that prohibited land sales to parties
other than the discovering sovereign or its successors while considering
native land title to be as “sacred as the fee”; 3) left tribal self-governance
intact except for foreign affairs; and 4) encouraged treaties between
tribes and the United States by which the federal government could
acquire land title and which promised federal protection of remaining
10
native lands.
Yet commentators have regularly chastised the discovery doctrine.
For example, Professor Williams has referred to the American discovery
doctrine as a “racist, colonizing rule of law,” supporting “conquest and
11
colonization” of a newly discovered world. Professor Miller considers
the discovery doctrine the means by which Europeans justified their
12
ethnic and religious superiority over non-European cultures and races.
Professor Watson claims that the discovery rule not only diminished
native rights in the United States but also in Australia, Canada, and New
13
Zealand. Professor Purdy charges that, as described by Marshall, the
doctrine amounted to an apology for “an agentless ethnic cleansing”
14
that, although opposed to natural law, was both inevitable and lawful.
Without wishing to necessarily challenge any of these assertions, I
contend that, even if accurate, they are the consequence of erroneous

5

See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592 (observing that occupancy title would give
natives a defense to an ejectment cause of action); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, § 4.01[2][e], at 219–20 (citing cases recognizing tribal
trespass and ejectment claims).
6
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955) (“[T]he taking
by the United States of unrecognized Indian title is not compensable under the Fifth
Amendment.”).
7
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
8
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
9
See Blumm, supra note 2, at 726–58 (discussing all five decisions).
10
Id. at 758–61.
11
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 325–26.
12
ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS
JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY 1–2 (2006).
13
Blake A. Watson, The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on Native Land
Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 507, 508 (2011).
14
Jedediah Purdy, Property and Empire: The Law of Imperialism in Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 330–31 (2007).

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1910876
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910876

Do Not Delete

978

2/14/2012 1:14 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:4

interpretations or unwarranted expansions of the discovery doctrine laid
down by the Marshall Court, especially in its Johnson decision. I maintain
that, had the Johnson opinion been properly interpreted within the
Anglo-American system of property law—to leave the tribes with a title in
fee simple absolute—the damage wrought by the American discovery
doctrine to American Indian tribes would have been much less
pronounced.
My argument is in three parts. Part I briefly reviews all five decisions
of the Marshall Court bearing on the discovery doctrine. Part II examines
Johnson v. M’Intosh more closely in light of all the Marshall Court’s
discovery doctrine decisions, explaining what the decision did and did
not hold. Part III explains why a proper interpretation of Johnson would
have prevented some of the more egregious results that ensuing courts
and scholars have attributed to the discovery doctrine.
II. THE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE ACCORDING
TO THE MARSHALL COURT
The Marshall Court’s discovery doctrine drew on international law
principles, but was also the product of the struggle of American settlers
to obtain access to, and ownership of, frontier lands, particularly along
15
the trans-Appalachian backwoods of the eighteenth century. In the
16
wake of the end of the French and Indian War, the Royal Proclamation
of 1763 forbade American colonists from purchasing Indian lands which,
while helping to avoid conflicts, infuriated colonial land speculators,
17
including George Washington, who claimed that the proclamation
15

See Blumm, supra note 2, at 719–26. However, the international law of
discovery, as modernly understood, actually did not apply to lands that were occupied
by natives, so the Court’s invocation of the discovery rule was inappropriate. See
INDIAN LAW RES. CTR., DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELATING TO NATIVE LANDS
AND NATURAL RESOURCES 14, 16–17 (lawyers ed. 2010) (citing 1 OPPENHEIM’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 678–79, 686–87 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, eds., 9th ed.
1992), and the International Court of Justice’s decision in the Western Sahara case,
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 79 (Oct. 16)).
16
Prior to the war (also known as the Seven Years War), the British Crown left
native affairs largely to local authorities. But during the war most tribes sided with the
French due to encroachments on native lands by British settlers, which often
included fraudulent land dealings. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 2, § 1.02[1], at 18–19. During the war, the British began to prohibit
settlements on native hunting grounds west of the Appalachians, a policy that kept
the strategically important Iroquois Confederacy aligned with the British. See DAVID
H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 60 (6th ed. 2011).
17
Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763, reprinted in DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CANADA, 1759–1791, at 163, 166–67 (Adam Shortt &
Arthur G. Doughty eds., 2d ed. 1918). Implementing the proclamation required new
forts along the Western frontier, which the Crown proposed to finance through a
stamp tax on the colonists, fueling the first fires of the Revolution. See Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Jefferson, The Norman Yoke, and American Indian Lands, 29 ARIZ. L. REV.
165, 171–73 (1987); see generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note 16, at 59–61 (discussing
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violated the natural rights of natives to sell their lands to willing buyers.
In effect, the Royal Proclamation established the first legal definition of
19
Indian Country as the crest of the Appalachian Mountains.
During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress continued
the British Crown’s policy of centralizing native affairs in the federal
20
government. Although the ensuing Articles of Confederation were
ambiguous about the relation of the federal government and the states
concerning native affairs, the Confederation Congress began making
treaties with tribes which gave the federal government the first option to
purchase Indian lands and promised to exercise “the utmost good faith”
21
toward natives and their lands in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance. The
same year, the Constitution decided the issue of Indian affairs squarely in
22
favor of central control by the federal government. This allocation of
authority made clear that the federal government would control Western
23
development and Indian affairs from 1790 onward. Thus, all sales of
24
native land would require federal approval. But there remained many
questions about the nature of the property rights possessed by the tribes,
which were left to the judiciary to resolve. The following five cases
addressed some of the unanswered issues and substantially clarified the
effect of the American version of the discovery rule.
25

A. Fletcher v. Peck

The first notable case implicating native land rights concerned the
Yazoo land-fraud scheme, in which the governor and nearly every
the history of British policies surrounding the proclamation and American
resentment). Chief Justice Marshall discussed the Royal Proclamation in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 547–48 (1832). See also Robert N. Clinton, The
Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict Over the
Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REV. 329, 356, 364–65, 369–70 (1989). On
Washington’s opposition to the Proclamation, which helped to drive him from British
Loyalist to American Revolutionary, see RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 148
(2010).
18
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 275–79.
19
See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV.
1055, 1090 (1995).
20
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, § 1.02[2], at 20.
21
See Blumm, supra note 2, at 723–25 (discussing ambiguous language in the
Articles, treaties with the Delaware in 1778 and the Cherokee in 1785, and the
Northwest Ordinance Act of Aug. 7, 1787, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 50, 52).
22
See id. at 725 (citing the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
23
The first Congress enacted the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 (Indians),
ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 137, 137, which confirmed the federalization of Indian affairs. An
1834 amendment to this statute is codified in part at 25 U.S.C. § 177.
24
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 2, § 1.03[2], at
37–38.
25
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). This discussion is adapted from Blumm, supra
note 2, at 726–30, which contains more detailed documentation and historical
context.
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member of the Georgia legislature was bribed to authorize cheap sales of
26
some 35 million acres in what is now Alabama and Mississippi. After an
election in which most of the corrupt representatives were defeated, a
new legislature attempted to rescind the sales, but in a collusive suit
27
arranged by land speculators, the Marshall Court upheld the land sales.
In a four-to-one decision written by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court
ruled that rescinding the sales would violate the Constitution’s Contracts
28
Clause.
Since the lands in question were aboriginal title lands, the
relationship between native land rights and the land-fraud scheme was
29
critical to the result of the case. Lawyers for both the sellers and the
buyers claimed that the sales were not inconsistent with native land rights
(the Indians, of course, were not represented in the case), and the Chief
Justice agreed, writing that Indian title existed until validly extinguished,
30
and it was not inconsistent with “seisin in fee on the part of the state.”
Thus, the legislature possessed the authority to convey an interest in
Indian-title lands to speculators. The Chief Justice did not explain how a
proper extinguishment of Indian title could occur, nor who could
31
extinguish it, nor what he meant by “seisin in fee.”
The majority opinion drew a dissent from Justice William Johnson,
who thought that the Chief Justice misinterpreted the discovery doctrine
which, according to Justice Johnson, gave the state only “a right of
32
conquest or of purchase, exclusively of all competitors.” Thus, the
state’s property interest was “a mere possibility,” while the natives’
33
interest was “absolute proprietorship” in the soil. Consequently, Justice
Johnson objected to Marshall’s characterization of the state’s interest as
seisin in fee because it was not a present interest, since it was “nothing
more than a power to acquire a fee-simple by purchase, when the
34
[seller] . . . should be pleased to sell[.]” He also disputed the Chief
Justice’s claim that the state’s title was consistent with Indian title because
35
he believed that a fee simple title meant exclusive rights. Justice
Johnson’s dissent is worth careful consideration because I believe that
36
Chief Justice Marshall, who discouraged publication of dissents, found it
26

Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 87–89.
Id. at 89–90, 142–43.
28
Id. at 87, 142–43. See U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142.
30
Id. at 142–43.
31
“Seisin” means possession of a freehold estate. 1 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 20, at 26 (Basil Jones ed., 3d ed. 1939) (equating seisin
with possession of a freehold).
32
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
33
Id. at 146.
34
Id. at 147.
35
Id. at 146–47.
36
Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial
Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 593 (1994).
27
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persuasive enough to implicitly adopt it thirteen years later in the second
of the important discovery doctrine cases of the Marshall Court.
37

B. Johnson v. M’Intosh

There have been quite a few recent additions to the scholarship
38
explaining this seminal case. We now know, for example, that, like
Fletcher v. Peck, Johnson was a collusive suit, contrived to settle the issue of
whether pre-Revolutionary grants from Indians to speculators were
39
valid. Congress had refused to affirm the sales despite nearly a half40
century of lobbying from the land companies. The case that eventually
reached the Supreme Court pitted Joshua Johnson and Thomas Graham,
who inherited the interest of one of the original speculators, who in turn
acquired rights that William Murray purchased from Indian chiefs in
1773 and 1775, against William McIntosh (whose name was misspelled by
the court reporter), a lawyer who represented landowners who had
purchased from the federal government under preemption statutes
roughly forty years after the original transactions between Murray and
41
the Indians.
Johnson and Graham, represented by famed Supreme Court
42
advocates Robert Goodloe Harper and Daniel Webster, argued that the
Court should recognize that the Royal Proclamation and the discovery
doctrine were inconsistent with the natural rights of natives and other

37

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). This discussion is adapted from Blumm, supra
note 2, at 731–46, which contains more detailed documentation and considerably
more history related to the case.
38
See, e.g., the scholarship cited supra in notes 12–14; STUART BANNER, HOW THE
INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND (2005); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE
DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005);
Hope M. Babcock, The Stories We Tell, and Have Told, About Tribal Sovereignty: Legal
Fictions at their Most Pernicious, 55 VILL. L. REV. 803 (2010); Jen Camden & Kathryn E.
Fort, “Channeling Thought”: The Legacy of Legal Fictions from 1823, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
77 (2008–2009); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D.
L. REV. 627 (2006); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 579 (2008); Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2010); Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From
Conquest & Possession to Democracy & Equal Opportunity, 86 IND. L.J. 763 (2011); Ann E.
Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and United
States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal
Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651 (2009).
39
See Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh,
19 LAW & HIST. REV. 67, 99–102 (2001).
40
See id. at 92–93.
41
See id. at 95–101. Preemption statutes gave squatters and others improving land
the exclusive right to purchase at a statutorily prescribed price (usually below market
value). The statutes followed treaties in the early nineteenth century negotiated by
William Henry Harrison which ceded land to the federal government in exchange for
federal protection. Id. at 93–94.
42
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 562 (1823).
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43

statutory and constitutional rights. McIntosh argued that the natives
had no right to sell to the speculators because the discovery doctrine
recognized no proprietary rights in people who lived in a state of nature,
and that the first principle of British colonial law was that all land titles
44
were derived from the Crown.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall adopted
neither perspective; although, in the end, he sided with McIntosh, as
45
successor to a federal grantee. He framed the issue narrowly: did the
46
Indians have the right to sell to private individuals? He concluded that
they did not, due to the Royal Proclamation, the discovery doctrine, and
the principle that all freely alienable land titles originated in government
47
grants.
Marshall’s view of the discovery doctrine was that it enabled a
discoverer to exclude competing European nations, giving the discoverer
48
a “title” which “might be consummated by possession.” But the doctrine
49
also “respected the right of the natives, as occupants.” The U.S. federal
government, which had inherited discoverer’s rights from England, thus
50
had the right to grant McIntosh and other federal grantees “the soil,” as
51
had been done in Fletcher v. Peck. Unlike in Fletcher, however, the Indian
right of occupancy had been apparently extinguished as a result of
52
treaties with the federal government. Under the discovery doctrine,
Johnson and the speculators obtained no alienable property interest
from the Indians, and thus McIntosh and the federal grantees prevailed
53
in the case.
Although the Indians were not represented before the Court, and
although Marshall’s characterization of the tribes’ property right as “right
of occupancy” proved to be a tragic choice of words, his opinion was
quite protective of native property rights, perhaps influenced by Justice

43

Id. at 562–67.
Id. at 567–71.
45
Id. at 587–88, 592–95, 604–05.
46
Id. at 572.
47
Id. at 592–604.
48
Id. at 573.
49
Id. at 574.
50
Id.
51
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Fletcher remains problematic in that the
government that conveyed “the soil” was the state government, even though the land
sales were in 1794, four years after Congress enacted the first Trade and Intercourse
Act, which federalized Indian land transactions. See supra note 23.
52
Cf. supra notes 25–36 and accompanying text (discussing Fletcher). The Johnson
opinion suggested that Indian title could be extinguished by conquest as well as
purchase. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587. But that proposition was abandoned by
the Court in Worcester eight years later, infra note 87, and expressly rejected in Mitchel
a dozen years later, infra note 104.
53
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592–95, 604–05.
44
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54

Johnson who had dissented in Fletcher, but who concurred in Johnson.
Marshall proclaimed that the discovery doctrine did not disregard native
55
rights, although it did restrict them. In language recalling Justice
56
Johnson’s dissent in Fletcher, he announced that the natives were “the
rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
57
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion.” Thus,
under the discovery rule that he articulated, the tribes retained a present
protectable interest in the possession and use of their lands. Possession
and use are two sticks in the property bundle of rights commonly
58
associated with a fee simple absolute.
The rights that the tribes lost through the discovery doctrine were
two, according to Marshall: 1) “their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations”; and 2) “their power to dispose of the soil at their
59
own will, to whomsoever they pleased.” The former is a sovereignty
concept—the tribes’ ability to conduct foreign affairs—and was clarified
60
by the Court in the Cherokee Nation case eight years later. The latter, a
property concept, is a restraint on alienation, and it was that issue that
decided the Johnson case, for the tribes had no right to convey property to
61
private, non-tribal individuals, only to the government. The reason for
loss of the right of free alienation was similar to the limit on tribal
sovereignty to conduct foreign affairs: national defense. It would have
been extremely destabilizing if tribes along the Western frontier could
sell their lands to foreign powers.
But Marshall, unfortunately, sowed the seeds of misunderstanding by
stating that the reasons for the two limitations on tribal rights had to do
with “the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive
62
title to those who made it.” He could not have intended the phrase
“exclusive title” to mean exclusive property rights because that would
54

Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147.
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574 (“[T]he rights of the original inhabitants
were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable
extent, impaired.”).
56
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
57
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
58
See 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 17.02 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d Thomas
ed. 2000).
59
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
60
See infra notes 71–83 and accompanying text.
61
On conveyances to tribal members, see infra note 67. Professor Kades has
suggested that this monopsony made it cheaper for the government to purchase
Indian lands. Kades, supra note 4, at 1105. I have argued that this monopsony also
protected the tribes from probable abuses of the tribes from states and private
parties, and that is how Marshall likely viewed the effect of his decision. See Blumm,
supra note 2, at 746 n.216, 776 n.414.
62
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. See also id. at 573 (explaining that the
discovery rule was aimed at avoiding “conflicting settlements” among European
colonialists; the doctrine “gave title [to the first discoverer] against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession”).
55
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contradict the tribes’ “legal as well as just” rights to possession and use
63
that he articulated earlier in the same sentence. Later in the opinion,
Marshall acknowledged that “[a]n absolute title to lands cannot exist, at
the same time, in different persons, or in different governments” because
“[a]n absolute, must be an exclusive title,” and there were no exclusive
64
rights in Indian title cases. Consequently, Marshall’s references to
65
“exclusive title” and “absolute title” must have meant sovereignty,
particularly external sovereignty. Similarly, references to “ultimate title”
and “seisin” in his opinion had to do with sovereign authority, not
66
proprietorship.
The only property right the tribes lost as a result of the Johnson
67
decision was the right of free alienation; they retained all other present
property interests. The government’s “title” in Indian lands was actually a
governance interest in external affairs and an exclusive right to
68
purchase—or right of preemption. The latter is a future interest and
would not be described by any modern property lawyer as a fee simple.
Nor did the federal government actually hold seisin in Indian lands,
63

Id. at 574 (“They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their
own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,
were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will,
to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”).
64
Id. at 588.
65
Marshall seemed to acknowledge that he was referring to sovereign authority
in the following passage: “All our institutions recognise the absolute title of the
crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognise the absolute title
of the crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with an absolute and
complete title in the Indians.” Id.
66
Id. at 592, 603. See also id. at 588 (explaining why “[a]n absolute title to lands
cannot exist” in different individuals or governments, since “[a]n absolute, must be
an exclusive title, or at least a title which excludes all others not compatible with it”).
67
Nothing in the Johnson opinion suggests that tribal members could not transfer
title to other tribal members under tribal law, or that tribal law could not authorize
transfers to white purchasers like Murray. But Johnson does make clear that whatever
rights such transferees obtained under tribal law would not be respected under U.S.
law after the land was conveyed by the tribe to the federal government. Thus, as
Professor Eric Freyfogle pointed out to me, the Johnson decision had the effect,
perhaps intended, of vesting tribal governments with significant power by making
them the only sellers of clear title, just as the federal government was the only buyer.
Email from Eric Freyfogle to Michael Blumm (Sept. 9, 2011) (also comparing the
limitations on tribes under Johnson with those imposed on the U.S. when purchasing
land in a foreign country) (on file with the author).
68
Marshall, in fact, cited with approval a 1779 Virginia statute that declared that
the state had an “exclusive right of pre-emption” as evidence that the government
had exclusive rights to purchase. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 565 n.a, 569. Of
course, the government, through its eminent domain power, always retains
something similar to a right of preemption, so perhaps Indian title is not distinctive
in this regard. But federal grantees, like McIntosh, were dependent on the exercise of
this governmental interest; they possessed what might be referred to as an executory
interest, a non-vested future interest in a third party. See Blumm, supra note 2, at 738.
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69

since that term means possession of a freehold interest, and the Johnson
decision made clear that it was the tribes who had possessory rights.
Despite this confusion in property concepts, Johnson established
several important principles. First, by recognizing the possessory rights of
tribes, the case made clear that these rights were not a function of
government recognition but in fact predated colonial governments.
Second, it legitimized the existing land tenure system under which all
freely alienable land titles were traceable to the federal government, thus
rewarding years of landowner reliance and keeping the federal
government in charge of Western land settlement. Third, it protected
national security by forbidding land sales to foreign governments and not
recognizing the sovereignty of Indian tribes to conduct foreign affairs.
Fourth, it was consistent with Marshall’s earlier decision in Fletcher
allowing the government to transfer private future interests in Indian-title
70
lands that remained subject to Indian title. Finally, and of considerable
long-term significance, the decision assumed that Indian title issues were
matters of domestic federal law, not international law, an assumption that
would prove disastrous to tribal proprietary rights and sovereign
authority over the next century and a half.
C. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia

71

This case was the fruit of a bitter conflict between the tribe and the
state, in which the latter attempted to appropriate tribal lands, annul
tribal laws, extend state law into Cherokee country, and require permits
72
of non-Indians residing there. The tribe claimed that all these initiatives
were inconsistent with its federal treaty of 1791 that recognized some five
73
million acres as their homeland. Since Congress, with the support of the
74
Jackson Administration, passed the Indian Removal Act in 1830,
essentially endorsing the state’s position, the tribe appealed to the only
remaining branch of government, filing an original petition in the U.S.
75
Supreme Court.
The case foundered on jurisdictional grounds, for the tribe needed
to show itself to be either a state or a foreign nation to obtain original

69

1 TIFFANY, supra note 31, § 20, at 26.
This is Professor Williams’ chief complaint about the discovery doctrine as
interpreted in the Johnson decision, as he argues that indigenous claims for territory
and self-government should be legitimately before international political and legal
fora. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 327.
71
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). This discussion is adapted from Blumm, supra note
2, at 747–51, containing more detailed documentation and historical context.
72
See Blumm, supra note 2, at 747–51.
73
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, art. 4, July 2, 1791, 7
Stat. 39, 39–40. See also Blumm, supra note 2, at 747–48.
74
Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, §§ 1–8, 4 Stat. 411, 411–12.
75
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 2.
70
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76

77

jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. In a decision with two dissents, the
Court dismissed the suit. Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the tribe was
neither a state nor a foreign nation, but instead was a “domestic
dependent nation[],” which had lost control over foreign affairs, was
dependent on the federal government for protection, and was reduced
78
to “a state of pupilage.” However ahistorical the tribe’s dependence on
79
the federal government actually was, the decision reinforced the
interpretation that the limitations the Court recognized on tribal
80
authority in Johnson had to do with external affairs. Marshall
acknowledged that the Cherokee Tribe was “a distinct political
81
society . . . capable of managing its own [internal] affairs.” His opinion
also reiterated the discovery doctrine, recognizing that “the Indians are
acknowledged to have an unquestionable . . . right to the lands they
occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to
82
our government.” But although Marshall recognized that the tribe
possessed internal sovereignty and proprietary rights, he concluded that
it was neither a state nor a foreign country, and therefore could not
83
obtain original jurisdiction in the U.S. Supreme Court.
84

D. Worcester v. Georgia

Only a year after the Court dismissed the Cherokee’s original
jurisdiction suit, it addressed some of the same issues in an appellate
decision involving Georgia’s jailing of Samuel Worcester, a missionary
convicted in state court for residing in Cherokee country without a state

76
Id. at 6, 20. See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, which limits the Court’s
original jurisdiction to, inter alia, “[c]ases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party.”
77
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20, 50 (Johnson, J. and Thompson, J.
dissenting, respectively).
78
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. The Court also, without evidence,
described tribal-federal relations as “resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian,” id.,
language that would later be unfortunately used by the Supreme Court of the late
nineteenth century to erect the arguably illegitimate “plenary power” of the federal
government over Indian tribes. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 175 (2002).
79
Justice Thompson’s dissent, published after the majority decision with the
encouragement of Chief Justice Marshall, claimed that the tribe and the federal
government had always treated each other largely as foreign nations. Cherokee Nation,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 53–54 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
80
See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
81
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16 (also noting that federal treaties and
statutes uniformly recognized the Cherokee as a “state” with a separate “political
character,” but not as a member of the United States).
82
Id. at 17.
83
Id. at 20.
84
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). This discussion is adapted from Blumm, supra
note 2, at 751–57, which contains more detailed documentation and context.
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85

license. Although the case involved whether state laws applied in
86
Cherokee country, Justice Marshall’s opinion revisited property issues,
perhaps on the assumption that the tribe’s sovereign authority depended
on its property rights. The Court rejected the state’s argument that
discovery terminated the Cherokee’s property rights, ruling after a
lengthy discussion of colonial charters that the King had the power to
convey to the colonials only that which he had: an “exclusive right of
87
purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell.” Consequently,
there was no conflict between discovery and the possessory rights of the
natives.
Nor did discovery terminate the Cherokee’s sovereign authority. The
Indians were “a distinct people . . . governing themselves by their own
88
laws.” Marshall drew on colonial practice in reaching this conclusion,
noting that “our history furnishes no example . . . of any attempt on the
part of the crown to interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians,
89
[other] than to keep out the agents of foreign powers.” Moreover, U.S.
policy after the Revolution did nothing to change this state of affairs. The
federal government signed treaties promising the tribes not only military
protection but also self-government, considering “the several Indian
nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the
90
lands within those boundaries.” Federal treaties with the Cherokee
“mark[ed] out the boundary that separate[d] the Cherokee country from
Georgia; guarant[eed] to [the tribe] all the land within their boundary;
solemnly pledge[d] the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens
from trespassing on it; and recognize[d] the pre-existing power of the
91
[Cherokee] nation to govern itself.” With this sort of geographic
separation between the state and Cherokee country, Georgia had no
jurisdiction to enforce its laws against Worcester, state laws being void as
92
“repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”
85

Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515.
See id. at 520.
87
Id. at 545. Discovery did not “give the discoverer rights in the country
discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors,” id. at 543,
but instead gave the discoverer only “the exclusive right to purchase.” Id. at 544. In
Worcester, Marshall abandoned the notion, mentioned in Johnson, that discovery
included conquest. See supra note 52. Instead, he now concluded that colonial
charters authorized no wars of conquest, contemplating only “defensive” and “just”
wars. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 545.
88
Id. at 542–43.
89
Id. at 547. Marshall thought it an “extravagant and absurd idea,” id. at 544, that
colonial settlements had the right to govern or occupy Indian lands, which “did not
enter the mind of any man.” Id. at 545.
90
Id. at 557.
91
Id. at 561–62.
92
Id. at 562. Although the Court ordered the release of Worcester and another
missionary from jail, the state refused to do so until the Georgia governor granted a
pardon a year later. In 1992, some 160 years later, the state issued another pardon
86
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The territorial sovereignty recognized in the Worcester decision
93
denied states the right to extinguish Indian title, an issue left ambiguous
in the Johnson case. In the wake of Worcester, not only did state laws have
no applicability within Indian country, but the only means to extinguish
94
Indian title was through federal purchase. Whatever “title” the federal
government held to Indian lands, it was not a “title” that included
possessory or use rights, and its acquisition required compensation to the
tribes.
95

E. Mitchel v. United States

The final case in which the Marshall Court considered the issues of
Indian proprietary rights concerned whether purchasers of Indian-title
lands could obtain alienable, fee simple title through subsequent federal
96
ratification. The lands involved in the case were acquired by a settler
before Florida was ceded by Spain to the United States in an 1819 treaty.
In the course of upholding fee title in the settler, the Court, in an
97
opinion by Justice Henry Baldwin, described Indian title as a “perpetual
98
right of possession,” while the government’s interest was now accurately
99
characterized as a future interest: an “ultimate reversion in fee.”
Justice Baldwin claimed that recognition of these rights was a
“uniform rule” from the onset of British settlement, as “friendly Indians
were protected in the possession of the lands they occupied, and were
considered as owning them . . . as their common property, from
100
generation to generation.” The fact the Indians used the lands as a
hunting commons did not reduce their possessory and use rights; they
retained exclusive rights “until they abandoned them, made a cession to
and an apology, calling the incident “a stain on the history of criminal justice in
Georgia” and expressing regret over usurping the tribe’s sovereignty and ignoring the
Supreme Court’s order. See JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 69 (2d ed. 2008).
93
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557 (“The treaties and laws of the United States
contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and
provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the
government of the union.”). See also id. at 520 (“The whole intercourse between the
United States and [the Cherokee] nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in
the government of the United States.”).
94
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
95
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835). This discussion is adapted from Blumm, supra
note 2, at 757–58, which contains additional documentation and historical analysis.
96
Mitchel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 718.
97
Justice Marshall was ill in 1835 and died before the year was out. Harold H.
Burton, John Marshall, The Man, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 3, 7 (1955).
98
Mitchel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 745.
99
Id. at 756. Later Supreme Court decisions would describe the government’s
interest as a “naked fee,” Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877), which
conveyed “no beneficial interest.” United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304
U.S. 111, 116 (1938).
100
Mitchel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 745.
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101

A sale
the government, or an authorized sale to individuals.”
authorized by the federal government would produce alienable title in a
grantee, and such authorization could result from a federal treaty, like
102
the Florida treaty.
But even though Indian title without federal ratification was
alienable only to the federal government, that property interest was “as
103
sacred as the fee simple of the whites.” The Mitchel opinion considered
this analogy to be a “settled principle,” even though the Court again
104
described the Indian land right as one of “occupancy.” This was an apt
description, for the only difference between Indian title and a fee simple
absolute at the time of the Mitchel decision was free alienability.
III. JOHNSON IN LIGHT OF ALL THE MARSHALL COURT’S
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE DECISIONS
In view of all five of the Marshall Court’s discovery doctrine
decisions, it is now possible to more precisely evaluate just what Johnson
decided. Fletcher, which preceded Johnson by thirteen years, allowed the
state to authorize sales of Indian-title lands to purchasers because the
105
state allegedly held “seisin in fee” to the lands. But Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion made no attempt to explain what these terms meant,
while at the same time claiming that they were consistent with native land
rights. Justice Johnson’s dissent in the case maintained that the Chief
Justice had inaccurately described “seisin”—which traditionally meant
106
possession of a freehold —because a freehold was a present possessory
interest, and the present possessory interest in Fletcher was held by the
107
Indian possessors.
Johnson, of course, followed, ruling that Indian title was burdened
with a partial restraint on alienation, albeit a considerable restraint: tribes
108
could sell only to the federal government. Marshall’s decision included

101

Id. at 746. The Court noted that tribal hunting grounds “were as much in
their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites.” Id.
102
Thus, with federal ratification, Indian title was freely alienable: “The Indian
right to the lands as property, was not merely of possession, that of alienation was
concomitant, both were equally secured, protected, and guaranteed by Great Britain
and Spain, subject only to ratification . . . .” Id. at 758.
103
Id. at 746.
104
Id. The Mitchel decision also expressly rejected the notion that conquest could
extinguish Indian title, as in treaties with the Indians, “the king [of England] waived
all rights accruing by conquest or cession, and thus most solemnly acknowledged that
the Indians had rights of property which they could cede or reserve.” Id. at 749. Since
the United States stood in the position of the English monarch, the federal government
could not assume a right of conquest renounced by its predecessor. Id. at 754.
105
See supra text accompanying note 31.
106
See supra note 31.
107
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
108
See supra notes 4, 61 and accompanying and following text.
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unfortunate but quickly discarded language about conquest, which
always catches disproportionate student attention. Marshall also
unfortunately described the discoverer’s rights as providing “exclusive
title,” although it is hard to know what he meant, since he also affirmed
the tribes’ “legal as well as just” rights to possession and use in the same
110
sentence. “Exclusive title” obviously did not mean rights to possess or
use. Instead, it meant an exclusive right to purchase Indian title and a
111
sovereign right to control foreign affairs. This is an awkward way to
describe “title,” but it is apparently what Chief Justice Marshall meant.
The Cherokee Nation case reinforced the notion that, except for the
restraint on alienation, the Johnson decision’s limitations on aboriginal
title were sovereignty limits, having to do with protecting national
112
security. Worcester made clear that, in addition to proprietary rights, the
113
natives had substantial sovereign authority. And Mitchel declared that
114
the native proprietary right was “as sacred as the fee.” That declaration
was accurate, if lost in the confusion about the meaning of the discovery
115
doctrine, since the only stick in the property bundle that the Marshall
Court denied to Indian title was the right of free alienation. A property
law professor would not conclude from that restriction that Indian title
was not a fee simple absolute.
Fee simples can exist with restraints on alienation, even severe ones,
116
so long as they are reasonable. The nature of the restraint articulated
in Johnson was the federal government’s exclusive right to purchase—a
117
right of preemption. The possessor of a right of preemption, a future
109

See supra notes 87, 104 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying and following text.
111
See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
112
See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
113
See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
114
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
115
ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at x (“Discovery converted the indigenous owners
of discovered lands into tenants on those lands.”); Knauer, supra note 38, at 30 (“The
doctrine of discovery, as announced in Johnson v. M’Intosh, justified title to all land in
the United States . . . .”); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian
Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) (“In a nutshell, the Doctrine of Discovery . . . came
to mean that when European, Christian nations first discovered new lands the
discovering country automatically gained sovereign and property rights in the
lands . . . .”).
116
Preemptory rights are valid if reasonable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.4 (1983). See, e.g., Ink v. Plott, 175 N.E.2d 94, 95–
98 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (preemptory rights may restrain alienation if the right is
reasonable and not against public policy); Drayson v. Wolff, 661 N.E.2d 486, 493 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996) (purpose of the preemptory right is a factor in determining
reasonableness of the restraint on alienation).
117
The Second Circuit, in one of the Oneida cases, recognized the government’s
right of preemption: “Thus, the concept of fee title in the context of Indian lands
does not amount to absolute ownership, but rather is used interchangeably with
‘right of preemption,’ or the preemptive right over all others to purchase the Indian
title or right of occupancy from the inhabitants.” Oneida Indian Nation v. New York,
110
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interest, does not have “seisin in fee,” as Marshall claimed, because a
118
preemptory right is not possession of a freehold. Similarly, federal
grantees like John Peck and William McIntosh had a future interest that
could not become a present possessory interest without the exercise of
the federal government’s preemptory right. This kind of future interest
119
in third parties is equivalent to an executory interest.
Chief Justice Marshall made no attempt to fit the proprietary rights
created by his interpretation of the American discovery rule into these
familiar Anglo-American property rights. Had he done so, he would have
been forced to reconsider his statements about “ultimate title” and
120
“seisin” in the government, for it was the Indians who held the fee
simple absolute. They had present possessory and use rights, the right to
sell to the government, and the right to compensation from sales.
Marshall’s reluctance to classify the property rights resulting from
discovery in Anglo-American law terms prevented him from seeing that
the tribes possessed a fee simple subject to a governmental preemptory
121
By assuming that discovery created a sui generis and
right.
unfortunately labeled right of “occupancy,” Marshall sowed the seeds of
misinterpretation that was to come over the next century and a half.
IV. THE UNFORTUNATE LEGACY OF MISCONSTRUING THE
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE
Perhaps arguing over the meaning of the discovery doctrine as laid
down by Johnson v. M’Intosh and the other Marshall Court decisions is
much ado about nothing. Perhaps, nearly 190 years later, it is too late to
set the record straight. But first—even if stare decisis makes improbable a
reinterpretation of the American law of discovery, as Professor Miller and
others have shown—the discovery doctrine has had quite an effect

691 F.2d 1070, 1075 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida,
414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974)). Even Thomas Jefferson in purchasing Louisiana
recognized that all the United States acquired was the preemptive right to buy land
from the “native proprietors.” See Miller, supra note 115, at 83.
118
2 TIFFANY, supra note 31, § 363, at 114; JOHN A. BORRON, JR., THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 1154 (3d ed. 2004).
119
See BORRON, supra note 118, § 1154. The Restatement (Third) distinguishes
preemptory rights from executory interests by suggesting preemptory rights should
not be subject to the rule against perpetuities. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 3.3 (2000). A majority of jurisdictions consider preemptory rights
executory interests. See Cont’l Cablevision of New England, Inc. v. United Broad. Co.,
873 F.2d 717, 722 n.11 (4th Cir. 1989).
120
See supra notes 30–31, 65–66 and accompanying text.
121
Eric Freyfogle commented that Marshall did not use the term of fee simple
because “that term only makes sense under Anglo-American law. It is not a term that
has any meaning under international law.” Freyfogle, supra note 67. Freyfogle also
suggested that the occupancy title Marshall created for the tribes could be thought of
as larger than a fee simple interest, since it was immune from state and local
regulation and taxation. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1910876

Do Not Delete

992

2/14/2012 1:14 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:4

122

beyond the United States, where the precedential value of American
decisions presumably is limited or nonexistent.
Second, the legacy of the misunderstood American law of discovery
is substantial. Failure to understand that the sovereignty limits imposed
123
by the doctrine were limited to foreign affairs allowed the 1903
Supreme Court to erect the “extra-constitutional” plenary power
124
doctrine, which authorized Congress to exercise virtually unbridled
authority to eviscerate treaty obligations in the infamous Lone Wolf v.
125
Hitchcock decision. Moreover, in probably the most regrettable of many
misguided Supreme Court Indian law decisions, the 1955 Court
misconstrued “occupancy title” to deny compensation for government
126
takings of Indian land in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States. Perhaps a
better understanding of the original American discovery doctrine would
127
lead courts to temper their interpretation of those decisions.
So, a reinterpretation of what the Marshall Court actually meant is
not a wholly academic exercise. My hope is that courts and commentators
revisit these decisions to scrutinize what they actually decided, and to
recognize that decisions like Lone Wolf and Tee-Hit-Ton were not only
badly reasoned, but were completely inconsistent with the origins of the
American rule of discovery as articulated by the Marshall Court.

122

Larissa Behrendt, The Doctrine of Discovery in Australia, in ROBERT J. MILLER ET
AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH
COLONIES 171 (2010); MILLER, supra note 12, at 24 (discussing the discovery doctrine
in the Philippines); Robert J. Miller & Jacinta Ruru, An Indigenous Lens into
Comparative Law: The Doctrine of Discovery in the United States and New Zealand, 111 W.
VA. L. REV. 849 (2009); Robert J. Miller et al., The International Law of Discovery,
Indigenous Peoples, and Chile, 89 NEB. L. REV. 819 (2011). See also Blumm, supra note 2,
at 713 n.1 (references to the influence of the American law of discovery on Australian
law); Watson, supra note 13 (exploring the doctrine in Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand).
123
See supra notes 59–61, 78–80 and accompanying and following text.
124
Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 99 (1993).
125
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564–68 (1903). See BLUE CLARK, LONE
WOLF V. HITCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS AND INDIAN LAW AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 71 (1994); Symposium, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: One Hundred Years Later, 38
TULSA L. REV. 1 (2002).
126
348 U.S. 272, 281, 285 (1955). See Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the
Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1216 (1980); Joseph
William Singer, Well-Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land
Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481, 492 (1994).
127
The Indian Law Resource Center maintains that the Supreme Court over the
years has not departed from the Marshall Court’s rulings on the doctrine of
discovery. INDIAN LAW RES. CTR., supra note 15, at 30–35 (citing several cases,
including City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 n.1 (2005)).
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V. CONCLUSION
One time-honored principle of Anglo-American property law is that
of numerus clausus—the idea that courts should not create new property
interests on their own motion because property interests, as in rem
rights, have widespread third-party effects extending well beyond the
128
particular parties in cases. This rule was violated by Marshall’s opinion
in Johnson, and the other decisions discussed above, because the Court
129
endorsed a wholly new kind of proprietary interest, one previously
unknown in Anglo-American law. Coupled with the fact that the Johnson
decision assumed that the proper forum for resolving Indian-title land
130
disputes was in U.S. federal courts, the sui generis nature of Indian title
gave the Marshall Court’s successors virtual carte blanche to deny tribes
131
compensation for government land seizures, and create out of whole
132
cloth the plenary power doctrine.
Marshall’s mistake in Johnson was in not attempting to fit Indian title
concepts into time-honored principles of Anglo-American property law.
Had he done so, he would have recognized that Indian title was a fee
simple subject to a governmental right of preemption.

128
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S373, S378–79, S409–10 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,
43–45 (2000).
129
See supra notes 48–70 and accompanying text.
130
See supra note 70 and following text.
131
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
132
See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.
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